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MEXICO'S EL CUCHILLO DAM PROJECT: A




Water development and management should be based on a
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy
makers at all levels. The participatory approach involves
raising awareness of the importance of water among the pol-
icy-makers and the general public. It means that decisions
are taken at the lowest appropriate level, and with full public
consultation and involvement of users in the planning and
implementation of water projects.'
This Article, 2 which examines certain aspects of Mexico's El
Cuchillo Dam on the San Juan River3 and related infrastructure
. Associate Professor and Director of the Inter-American Legal Studies Program
at the St. Mary's University School of Law in San Antonio, Texas. The author expresses
his gratitude to several colleagues at the St. Mary's University School of Law for their
collaboration: Monica Schurtman, Co-Director of the Immigration and Human, Associate
Professors Emily Hartigan and Reynaldo Valencia.
1. Dublin Statement, Principle No. 2, International Conference on Water and the
Environment, Jan. 31, 1992, in GLOBAL WATER RESOURCE IsSUES 162 (Gordon J. Young
et al. eds., 1994). The Dublin Statement, which addresses critical issues concerning wa-
ter and sustainable development, was adopted by the International Conference on Water
and the Environment, held in Dublin, Ireland, January 26-31, 1992. Approximately 500
individuals participated, including government-designated experts from one-hundred
countries and representatives from eighty international, intergovernmental and nongov-
ernmental organizations. Id. at 161. At the outset, Principle No. 2 offers a measure
against which the facts of the El Cuchillo Dam Project may be compared.
2. The author acknowledges the collaboration of the Border Center for the Promo-
tion of Human Rights (Centro Fronterizo para Ia Promoci6n de los Derechos Humanos,
A.C.) (CEFPRODHAC), a nongovernmental human rights organization, and its founder
and president, Mr. Arturo Solis, of Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico, in documenting the
case of the El Cuchillo Dam Project. See CEFPRODHAC, CRISIS EN TAMAULIPAS "PRESA
EL CUCHILLO" (Oct. 1996).
3. The San Juan River, a tributary of the Rio Grande River, originates in the
mountains of the northern Mexican state of Nuevo Le6n and flows north through the
state of Tamaulipas. The northern border of Tamaulipas, formed by the Rio Grande
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(El Cuchillo Project or Project) in relation to international law, is
the first in a series of articles concerning the same case-study.
The complexities and repercussions of a large infrastructure
project, particularly one located near an international border,
raise a multitude of concerns requiring legal analysis. 4 The
author's symposium presentation focused primarily on the El
Cuchillo Project, and some of its environmental harms, as com-
pelling examples of why the right to a healthy environment5
should be regarded as a human right.6 The case-study also fo-
cused on: the El Cuchillo Project's environmental and other re-
lated impacts in Mexico and the United States; the responses of
governmental authorities on both sides of the Rio Grande River;
the role of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which
financed a large portion of the Project; and associated violations
of domestic and international law. This abstract primarily seeks
to present a general factual overview of the case-study and a
summary of the author's investigation and research in this area.
7
The El Cuchillo Project was completed in less than six years
during the administration of former President Carlos Salinas de
River, starts to the northwest of the city of Nuevo Laredo and extends eastward to the
Gulf of Mexico.
4. The author is preparing five articles covering distinct aspects of the same case-
study, with the following working titles: The Impacts of Mexico's El Cuchillo Dam Project
in the State of Tamaulipas: A Study in Non-Sustainable Development and Authoritarian
Government; Mexico's El Cuchillo Dam Project and the Agreements on Water Between the
Governors of the States of Nuevo Ledn and Tamaulipas: Water Sharing or Water Grab-
bing?; Governmental Reaction to Impacts of Mexico's El Cuchillo Dam Project in the
United States: Hear No Evil, See No Evil . . . ; The Inter-American Development Bank's
Financing of Mexico's El Cuchillo Dam Project: Bankrolling the Privatization of Water
Infrastructure and Environmental Destruction in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region; and
Mexico's El Cuchillo Dam Project: An Example of Why Planning, Management, and Regu-
lation is Necessary for the Entirety of an International Watercourse.
5. During the last twenty years, human rights advocates and others have ad-
vanced claims for the existence of a "third generation" of solidarity rights, including the
right to development, the right to peace, and the right to a healthy environment. See
Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 14
(Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 1992). Such rights are suggested by
Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims that "everyone
is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights set forth in this Decla-
ration can be fully realized." Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
U.N. Doc. 8/811 (1948).
6. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 61, 61-69 (Anthony
D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996).
7. Most of the facts concerning the El Cuchillo Project were obtained from Mexican
press reports; CEFPRODHAC, supra note 2; project-related documents obtained from the
IDB; interviews conducted by the author; and private correspondence. All documents are
on file with the author.
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Gortari from 1988 to 1994. The Project's goal was to increase the
availability of water for residential and industrial purposes in
the city of Monterrey, the capital of the state of Nuevo Le6n.
Most of the region in Nuevo Le6n and Tamaulipas affected by
the El Cuchillo Project is arid to semi-arid. The El Cuchillo
Dam, the cornerstone of the Project, is located on the San Juan
River, approximately fifty miles south of the U.S.-Mexico border
and sixty-one miles northeast of Monterrey, near the town of
China, Nuevo Le6n. The San Juan River, a tributary of the Rio
Grande River, flows south to north and is wholly within Mexican
territory. The new El Cuchillo Reservoir possesses a maximum
storage capacity of 1.46 million acre/feet over an area of 40,000
acres and is an area forty-five times larger than the second larg-
est reservoir that provides water to Monterrey. The Project also
includes a steel-pipe aqueduct and five pumping stations which
carry water from the El Cuchillo Dam uphill for sixty-four miles
to the city of Monterrey. Additionally, the Project includes infra-
structure and equipment to facilitate water delivery to custom-
ers in the surrounding Monterrey area.
Another major element of the El Cuchillo Project consists of
the planned construction of sewage systems to collect untreated
sewage and wastewater from an area north and east of Monter-
rey; historically, such effluent has flowed into the San Juan
River. The collected sewage is to be pumped to three new sew-
age treatment plants which, in turn, will send the treated efflu-
ent into the Pesqueria River. The Pesqueria River flows north of
and, more or less, parallel to the San Juan River. Both rivers
flow out of Nuevo Le6n and into Tamaulipas, where the
Pesqueria River then flows into the San Juan River.
Sending treated effluent from the Monterrey area into the
Pesqueria River will prevent contamination of the new El
Cuchillo Reservoir, and purportedly, will maintain the water
level of an older downstream reservoir located behind the Marte
R. Gomez Dam, approximately thirty miles west of Reynosa,
Tamaulipas.8 The Marte R. Gomez Dam, built in the 1930s, is
situated approximately five miles south of the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der and forty-five miles downstream of the El Cuchillo Dam.
The need to maintain the level of the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir




with treated effluent delivered by the Pesqueria River was con-
firmed by an agreement signed in 1990 by several federal agen-
cies and the governors of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n (the 1990
San Juan River Basin Agreement). 9 Through this agreement,
the two governors pledged, in general terms, to ensure the effec-
tive management of the San Juan River Basin and to maintain
the water level of the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir. The need to
provide water to the Twenty-Sixth Irrigation District, which sur-
rounds the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir and is bordered by the Rio
Grande River to the north, was expressly addressed. Over
10,000 independent Tamaulipan farmers live in the Twenty-
Sixth Irrigation District.
The construction of a canal to enable Reynosa to draw its
drinking water from the Rio Grande River was the final signifi-
cant element of the Project. Reynosa had utilized the Marte R.
Gomez Reservoir as its chief source of drinking water before the
El Cuchillo Dam was built. Project designers must have known
that, upon completion of the El Cuchillo Dam, the downstream
flow of the San Juan River would be inadequate to satisfy the
irrigation needs of the Twenty-Sixth Irrigation District and the
potable water needs of Reynosa.
Development of the El Cuchillo Project progressed at break-
neck speed during the presidency of Carlos Salinas, who as-
sumed office in January 1988. The Project was designed, envi-
ronmental impact studies were undertaken, financing was
received from the IDB, and construction on the El Cuchillo Dam
was completed by October 1994, at which time President Salinas
inaugurated the dam. 10 Construction costs of the El Cuchillo
Project are estimated at approximately U.S. $650 million. The
IDB provided loans totaling approximately U.S. $325 million.1
9. Acuerdo de Coordinaci6n que Celebran el Ejecutivo Federal Atraves de las Secre-
tarfas de Programaci6n y Presupuesto, Contralorla General de la Federacidn, de Agricul-
tura y Recursos Hidradlicos, de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologfa, la Comisi6n Nacional del
Agua y los Ejecutivos de los Estados Libres y Soberanos de Nuevo Ledn y Tamaulipas,
Para la Realizacidn de un Programa de Coordinacidn Especial Para el Aprovechamiento
de la Cuenca del Rio San Juan, con el Objeto de Satisfacer Demandas de Agua Para Usos
Urbanos e Industriales de la Ciudad de Monterrey y Preservar las de Usos Mdltiples del
Distrito de Riego No. 026, en el Estado de Tamaulipas, dated May, 1990 (on file with the
author).
10. By comparison, construction of such a project in the United States probably
would have been preceded by more than ten years of litigation simply to settle disputes
concerning potential environmental impacts.
11. Total costs of the Project are currently unclear. The IDB initially intended to
[Vol. 28:2428
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In the fall of 1993, the area and residents downstream began
to suffer devastating impacts when the floodgates closed to fill
the new reservoir, particularly in the state of Tamaulipas.
1 2 One
devastating result has been the drastic reduction in the water
level of the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir to less than twenty per-
cent of its prior level. Also, the San Juan River has completely
dried up between the El Cuchillo Dam and the point downstream
where the Pesqueria River joins the San Juan River. No signifi-
cant flows of water have been permitted past the El Cuchillo
Dam. Monterrey began siphoning away water almost as quickly
as the new reservoir began to fill.
As of November 1996, the new Monterrey sewage treatment
plants were not operating at full capacity, if at all. Untreated
sewage and wastewater were collected to prevent contamination
of the El Cuchillo Reservoir, but were dumped into the Pesqueria
River largely without treatment. As a result, much of the water
which remains in the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir is highly pol-
luted.
The situation has been severely aggravated by a devastating
drought which has laid siege to northern Mexico for the last
three to four years. The coincidence between the start-up of the
El Cuchillo Dam and the regional drought has provided Mexican
authorities with the convenient excuse that Tamaulipas' water
problems are a product of the drought. Undoubtedly, the
drought has made matters much worse; however, but for the El
Cuchillo Dam, the water level of the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir
would be much higher and not as contaminated.
The drastic drop in the water level of the Marte R. Gomez
Reservoir has devastated northern Tamaulipas. Many of the ap-
proximately 300 families which earned their living by fishing in
the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir have lost their traditional liveli-
hood. The farmers of the Twenty-Sixth Irrigation District have
no irrigation water and, thus, have lost their crops over several
planting seasons. In 1995, after they protested vociferously,
these farmers received the equivalent of approximately U.S. $15
finance the new Monterrey sewage treatment plants; however, sources at the IDB indi-
cate that the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund provided last minute fi-
nancing. The precise sums involved are not known at this time.
12. IDB officials contend that populations affected by the El Cuchillo Project were
effectively consulted by Mexican authorities. In all likelihood, if any genuine consulta-
tions were undertaken, they took place only in Nuevo Le6n.
1996-971
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million in compensation, or approximately 870 pesos per hec-
tare 13 of cultivated land-the approximate cost of one ton of corn.
The affected farmers estimate their actual losses to be several
times above the compensated amount.14 By contrast, the fishing
families have received no compensation.
Many Tamaulipan residents, dependent on the Marte R.
Gomez Reservoir for their livelihoods of fishing or farming, sold
their instruments of the trade, boarded up their homes, and
moved to the United States. Many are reported to be working in
Texas as undocumented laborers. Colonies of former Tamauli-
pan residents have been established in Houston and San Anto-
nio, Texas.
Some reports indicate that a few local residents who are un-
able to fish or farm have turned to an even more lucrative em-
ployment alternative--drug trafficking. Local residents are
familiar with shortcuts and country paths leading up the U.S.
border. Such knowledge is invaluable to traffickers, who need
local guides to help move drug shipments northward.
Local merchants, who earned a living based on recreational
fishing at the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir, have also lost their
livelihood. Restaurants and rustic inns in the area have been
forced to shut down. Piers and boat launches are now hundreds
of yards from the water's edge.
Centro Fronterizo para la Promoci6n de los Derechos Huma-
nos, A.C. (CEFPRODHAC) 15 filed a complaint before the Na-
tional Human Rights Commission (Comisi6n Nacional de Dere-
chos Humanos) (CNDH)1 6 and federal district court on behalf of
the farmers of the Twenty-Sixth Irrigation District and the fish-
ermen who lost their livelihoods. CEFPRODHAC alleged viola-
tions of the 1990 San Juan River Basin Agreement and an ear-
lier presidential decree, dated 1952, which had granted the use
of the San Juan River to the state of Tamaulipas. 7 By Novem-
ber 1996, both complaints were dismissed on questionable
13. See CEFPRODAC, supra note 2, at 16.
14. Id. CEFPRODAC has sought to document such amounts.
15. See generally supra note 2.
16. The CNDH is Mexico's national governmental human rights entity charged with
investigating human rights violations. Its mandate includes jurisdiction over complaints
concerning environmental harms.
17. Unconfirmed reports claim that much of the water being drawn from the El
Cuchillo Reservoir for use in Monterrey is being consumed by industrial users.
[Vol. 28:2
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grounds. 18
Residents, who remained in the vicinity of the Marte R.
Gomez Reservoir, have been forced to turn to alternative water
sources. Some have drilled authorized or unauthorized wells,
which may be lowering the water table in both the area and
Texas. Moreover, some farmers of the Twenty-Sixth Irrigation
District have pumped water directly from the Rio Grande River
without authorization.
In response to worsening draught conditions in Mexico, the
United States and Mexican governments signed an emergency
water loaning agreement in October 1995. The United States
agreed to loan U.S. water in the binational reservoirs located on
the Rio Grande River to Mexico for drinking and home use. 19
By April 1996, severe drought conditions had spread to Texas.
Unauthorized pumping from the Mexican side of the Rio Grande
River, known as diversions, had reached such proportions that
the Lower Rio Grande Valley Water District Manager's Associa-
18. The CNDH rejected the complaint regarding the 1990 San Juan River Agree-
ment on the grounds that the one-year statute of limitations period under which the
CNDH operates expired one year after the agreement was signed. The CNDH ignored
the fact that the alleged harms were ongoing.
The complaint in federal court was dismissed because the complaining parties
had no standing to complain of a breach of what was essentially an agreement between
two contractual parties. Moreover, the contractual parties, i.e., the two state governors,
had reached an understanding over any alleged breaches to the 1990 San Juan River
Agreement in another agreement signed in February 1996.
The claim concerning the alleged violation of the presidential decree of 1952
was dismissed because the various agreements between the two state governors did not
constitute violations of the decree. Ignoring the facts, the court noted that the El
Cuchillo Project was designed to provide irrigation water to the Twenty-Sixth Irrigation
District via the Pesqueria River.
The CNDH has been widely accused of acting with political motives as have
Mexico's courts. See, e.g., Ra6l M. SAnchez, Mexico's Government Human Rights Com-
missions: An Ineffective Response to Widespread Human Rights Violations, 25 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1041 (1994). In January 1996, the problems surrounding the El Cuchillo Project be-
gan receiving significant national public attention in Mexico. The press widely reported
public protests and the exchange of insults between the Governors of Nuevo Le6n and
Tamaulipas. Both Governors filed legal actions against the other state. The National
Water Commission (omisi6n Nacional del Agua)(CNA) intervened and, after the Febru-
ary 1996 agreement was reached between the two state governors, the matter was no
longer discussed publicly. Many observers believed that a political solution was being
prepared. Yet, a third agreement was signed by the two state governors in November
1996. This agreement was soon denounced by numerous citizen organizations in
Tamaulipas, including farmers of the Twenty-Sixth Irrigation District, as inadequate and
a political sellout.
19. Mark Smith, Bush Will Remind Mexico to Honor Water-Sharing Accord,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 31, 1996.
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tion (Rio Grande Water Association or Association) wrote to the
U.S. section of the International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion (IBWC), 20 on behalf of twenty-three water districts holding
the majority of water rights below Falcon Dam.21 This letter ex-
pressed the Association's "serious concern and protest concerning
the diversion of water on the right [Mexican] bank of the [Rio
Grande] River by individuals in Mexico....122
The Rio Grande Water Association sought an accounting of
the amount of water released from the Falcon Reservoir, which
the IBWC had allegedly authorized to cover water diversions
documented by the IBWC. The Association noted a severe water
shortage was affecting south Texas, and that Mexican diversions
from the Rio Grande River disrupted proper and efficient water
management of the available water supply. The Association's
letter closed with the statement: "United States water users are
losing water on a daily basis due to these Mexican diversions."
23
The state government of Texas also became involved and com-
plained directly to the Mexican section of the IBWC.
24
Diversions from either bank of the Rio Grande River histori-
cally have not presented a serious problem between the United
States and Mexico. The Mexican and U.S. sections of the IBWC
usually agree to subtract the diverted amounts from the relevant
water allocations which remain in the Falcon or Amistad Reser-
voirs; however, by early 1996, the water remaining in the bina-
tional reservoirs, which was allocated to Mexico, had dropped to
less than twenty percent. By August 1996, the amount allocated
to Mexico in the Falcon Reservoir reached less than ten percent,
according to the IBWC. In the future, Mexico may have no allo-
cated water from which to subtract diversions, thus, creating a
situation which may lead to dramatic conflicts with the United
20. The IBWC, a binational agency, manages binational water resources according
to the terms of binational water treaties signed by Mexico and the United States. One
principal IBWC task on the Rio Grande River is to manage releases of water, allocated to
either Mexican or U.S. water users, from the Amistad Reservoir, on the upper portion of
the river, and the Falcon Reservoir, on the lower portion of the river.
21. Falcon Dam, located southeast of Laredo, Texas, is one of two binational dams
on the Rio Grande. The other is Amistad Dam. See also supra note 20.
22. Letter from Wayne Halbert, President of the Rio Grande Water Association, to
The Honorable John Bernal, Commissioner of the United States Section of the IBWC,
(Apr. 17, 1996)(on file with the author).
23. Id.
24. The Mexican section is also referred to by its Mexican acronym, CILA (Comisi6n
Internacional de Limites y Aguas).
[Vol. 28:2
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The Mexican government, through the Mexican section of
the IBWC, responded with assurances that Mexico would honor
all treaty obligations concerning the Rio Grande River. It also
agreed to take steps to control diversions. By November 1996,
the two sections of the IBWC still had not negotiated a resolution
to the diversions of which the Rio Grande Water Association had
complained.
Other widespread negative effects of the El Cuchillo Project
are likely. The creation of the new reservoir and the disappear-
ances of a large portion of the Marte R. Gomez Reservoir and a
long segment of the San Juan River have, undoubtedly, affected
the habitats of numerous plant and animal species. The ranges
of some animals are limited to the areas of Mexico and Texas,
which are affected by the El Cuchillo Project. Some animals
travel among several nations, as in the case of migratory fowl
and are legally protected by international treaties. Erosion of
dry river and lake beds and previously irrigated crop lands has
increased. Groundwater levels in the United States and Mexico
have been affected. The city of Reynosa, Tamaulipas must now
pump its drinking water from the Rio Grande River, which is ex-
tremely polluted with raw sewage, heavy metals, and other in-
dustrial wastes. The possibility of spreading disease has in-
creased. Anecdotal evidence, attributable to reduced availability
of clean water, points to higher incidences of gastro-intestinal
diseases, cholera, and dengue fever in northern Tamaulipas.
The extent of the economic and environmental impacts of
the El Cuchillo Project has not been assessed because authorities
in the United States and Mexico have not even acknowledged
that a problem exists. Mexican authorities insist that the cur-
rent drought, plaguing much of northern Mexico, is to blame. In
the United States, officials are either ignorant of the situation
altogether or have focused on "bigger" problems which affect the
Unites States and Mexico, like the toxic wastes and raw sewage
dumped into transborder waterways, including the Rio Grande
River. Because the San Juan River is a "Mexican" river, some
officials conveniently label any problems which flow therefrom as
"Mexican" problems and of no official concern to the United
States. Consequently, U.S. authorities are not disposed to file a
diplomatic note with Mexico concerning its use of the San Juan
River and are even more disinclined to seek redress for harms to
1996-97]
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U.S. citizens in an international legal forum.
Thus far, the government of Mexico has not fully apprised
its citizens or the U.S. government of the El Cuchillo Project's
many impacts. Meanwhile, state and federal officials in the
United States have not expressed any concerns, sua sponte, re-
garding such impacts. A few officials have confidentially stated
that the situation is "too political." Such silence is especially
troubling given that U.S. taxpayers indirectly contributed to the
El Cuchillo Project, through the Project's financial support from
the IDB.
25
As of yet, the IDB has not acknowledged that any problems
exist with the El Cuchillo Project. IDB officials blame the
drought in northern Mexico for any water shortages in the state
of Tamaulipas. Nevertheless, IDB officials have acknowledged
that the new Monterrey sewage treatment plants have not been
completed, and that untreated effluent has been sent down the
Pesqueria River to Tamaulipas as a consequence of the El
Cuchillo Project, which the IDB helped finance. Environmental
impact statements, drafted by Mexican authorities and released
by the IDB, reveal that potential impacts in Tamaulipas and
Texas were never contemplated. It remains to be seen if the IDB
will assume any responsibility for the economic, social, and envi-
ronmental harms, which are now so obvious.
The instant case-study concerning the El Cuchillo Project is
a study of government failures. These failures include:
* failure to respect domestic laws, national constitutions,
international customary law, and treaties concerning environ-
mental matters;
* failure to honor citizen rights to information, governmen-
tal consultation, health, and a healthy environment, to prompt
and fair compensation, to petition the government, and to earn a
living;
e failure to correctly assess and internalize predictable
costs or both to the environment and a region's inhabitants caus-
ed by a large, infrastructure project in an international trans
border setting;
25. The IDB receives its largest capital contributions from the U.S. government.
[Vol. 28:2
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* failure to develop appropriate legislation where existing
legislation is inadequate;
* failure to mitigate harm once it has occurred;
" failure to advise a neighboring government and its in-
habitants with respect to impending and ongoing harms;
* failure to provide for public involvement in project plan-
ning; and
* failure to assess harm caused by a neighboring govern-
ment's infrastructure project.
This case-study also considers these issues:
* Mexico's domestic governance and overall development
policies;
" U.S. government policies concerning Mexico;
* the planning, management, and regulation of the Rio
Grande River, and all of its tributaries and related groundwater
sources, as a shared international watercourse;
26
* the strategies, procedures and policies of multilateral
lending institutions, including the IDB;
* the role of non-governmental organizations in pressuring
governments to act lawfully;
* the need for developing existing legal regimes (including
the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the new North America
Commission on Environmental Cooperation created under
NAFTA) to address the issues raised by the case-study; and
* the need for developing new legal regimes and hemi-
spheric legal institutions for protecting the environment in the
Americas.
In the U.S.-Mexico border region, the governments of the
United States and Mexico are often too willing to tolerate high
levels of environmental degradation and the violations of inter-
national law, which may accompany such degradation, for the
sake of short-sighted trade and industrial development. The
case of the El Cuchillo Project is but one example of how citizens
26. See, e.g., Stephen C. McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts
Draft Articles on International Watercourses, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 395 (1995).
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on both sides of the Rio Grande River are left without immediate
or effective remedies for many of the environmental harms they
must endure, which are permitted and perpetrated by their gov-
ernments.
